FREE ESSAY ON CAESAR AND POMPEY

CAESAR AND POMPEY

The conference at Luca was a very important marker in the course of events in
Rome during this time. The principal result of the conference was that Caesar was
assured
of sufficient time to complete the conquest of Gaul, but conceded parity of armament to
his partners and gave Pompey the sole control of affairs in the capital. Soon after that
very violent and threatening riots arose in Rome. The riots brought about an emergency
coalition between the Senate and Pompey. "Why should this alliance not be extend to
other objects?" asked many of Pompey's loyal senators. This swelling group of extremists
began to desire to rid themselves of Caesar totally. For the next two years they
campaigned on a mission which actively pursued this goal. Early in 51 B.C., Caesar sent
a
request to the Senate for a further prolongation of his command in Gaul until the end of
49, thus closing the gap between his proconsulship and his second consulship(Cary 277). 
These loyal extremists swiftly rejected this proposal and reacted by making a counter
proposal. It stated that Caesar's term would be abbreviated so as to expire on 1 March
50, on the plea that the reduction of Gaul was now complete(Cary 268). This motion was
vetoed by C. Scribonius Curio, but the extremist group did not stop. They demanded that
Caesar and Pompey each surrender one legion for service against the Parthians. "Since
Pompey, as expected, asked for the return of one of his legions from Spain, which he had
lent to Caesar in 53, the net result of this square deal was that Caesar lost two
legions"(Cary 268). Curio, with Caesar's best interest at heart, proposed a new deal
which would declare the joint disarmament of both Caesar and Pompey. This proposal
was shot down by a vote of three hundred seventy votes to twenty-two votes. The
extreme corner of the Senate then "appealed to Pompey to ignore constitutional scruples
and to save the Republic by mobilizing his troops in order to bring immediate pressure
upon Caesar"(Cary 268). Pompey fell to the persuasion and followed the advice of the
extremist senators. From this moment the die was as good as cast.
Caesar replied to Pompey's actions by summoning his legions from France to his
winter quaters near Ravenna. This made the remaining talks between the two leaders like
that of two men pointing guns at each other. Caesar made several attempts to reach
peace. One example came late in December when he offered to surrender Transalpine
Gaul at once and his other province on the day of his election to a second
consulship(Cary
268). However, when the extremist group of the Senate saw that Pompey was taking
Caesar's offer under consideration, they were able to compel him to reject it all
together. 
Another attempt at peace which Caesar made came on New Year's Day 49 B.C. Caesar
repeated the proposal made by Curio for joint disarmament, but this time Pompey himself
said without hesitation, "no". The extremist group again tried to have Caesar relived of
his duty in Gaul prematurely, but again it was vetoed. Then Pompey pressured the Senate
to pass the Decree of Emergency, thus handing the Republic to the care of the consuls
and
proconsuls, which meant, in effect, to Pompey. Three days later Caesar was informed of
this resolution -- equivalent to an ultimatum bidding him to surrender himself. Caesar
was
now faced with a very hard decision.
After an anxious hour of reflecting in solitude, he made his decision. His reply was
to cross the Rubicon and to invade Italy. He made six further overtures in the course of
the next eighteen months. Some of these advances were rejected by Pompey himself,
while others were rejected by the escort of extremists that stood guard over him. The
civil
war was now in full motion, and the question was, "who was to blame?" "From the point
of view of formal law Caesar was the person mainly responsible for the civil war"(268
Cary). In 59 B.C., he had laid himself open to prosecution by using physical force for
political ends(268 Cary). His demand for an additional extension of his proconsulship in
order to evade impeachment was unconstitutional and set a bad precedent. Lastly, in
crossing the Rubicon he committed high treason. On the other hand, the privileges which
Caesar demanded were no more irregular than the position actually held by Pompey in
Spain. Furthermore, in calling upon Pompey to put military pressure upon the Senate and
in overriding M. Antonius's veto at the beginning of 49, the enemies of Caesar became
guilty of violating the constitution of which they were the champions. On broader
grounds it may be said that the civil war was not directly made by Caesar. Because
Caesar
was faced with the choice of either self defense or political extension by the Senate, he
can
not be totally to blame. Ironically the "twenty-two extremist senators who insisted on
Caesar's immediate recall were in fact insisting on civil war. To them the feud with
Caesar had become a higher object than the welfare of the State"(Cary 269). 
As the civil war began it seemed that Caesar was going to be in grave danger. The
total force at his command fell short of fifty thousand men, and less than one legion
was
stationed with him at Ravenna. Pompey, on the other hand, had at his disposal the entire
resources of the Roman empire outside of Gaul. One major difference between the two
forces was that Caesar's army consisted of seasoned veterans who were ready to draw
together quickly, while Pompey possessed hardly any trained troops, except the two which
Caesar had handed over. All in all, this made for a well matched battle between the two.
Caesar began the war with his first march to Italy. "The first week of the
campaign of 49 virtually decided the fate of Italy"(Cary 270). Because Pompey was
unprepared in Italy, Caesar made his first advance at a bewildering pace, seizing two of
the principal Apennine passes into Etruia unharmed. Pompey realized the obvious danger
he was in at this point and fled from Rome to Capua without hesitation. plan. Pompey,
hoping Caesar would be stalled in southern Italy, planed to collect his troops and
devolpe
a stragety. However, these hopes were crushed by Caesar's remorseless progress down
the east coast of the peninsula and the rapid arrival of his remaining legions from
Transalpine Gaul(Cary 270). L. Domitius made an unauthorized attempt to intercept
Caesar's vanguard at Corfinium, but he found himself encircled by the enemy legions
converging upon him in unexpected force. The Italian campaign then became a race for
Brundisium. This race was won by Pompey. He masked his departure and drew off the
whole of his remaining forces, which added up to about five legions. He shook off the
pursuit of Caesar, who had no ships to follow him across the Adriatic. This spoiled
Caesar's attempt to end the war without battle and gave Pompey time to organize his
army for a second campaign(Cary 270). This was still a victory for Caesar ,though,
because in two months time he had swept all of Italy and had almost no loss to his side.

The rest of 49 B.C. for Caesar was spent in securing his rear.
Caesar was now ready to return home to Rome from the battlefield. His first
priority once he returned was to capture the machinery of the government for his own
uses. However most of the magistrates and leading senators had left the city with
Pompey. Caesar made an attempt to call together the Senate, but it became clear that he
was not going to gain their support in his fight with Pompey. Because he knew this, he
made no further attempts to place his power on a constitutional basis. It was by mere
right of conquest that he broke into the treasury, which his flustered adversaries had
not
completely emptied when they fled the city(Cary 271). Caesar also did not take the
opportunity of enrolling troops after his victory in Italy. He did however incorporate
in
his army most of the troops captured from Pompey, to the end of the civil war he would
put most his trust in veterans from Gaul. But Caesar had already in fact dispelled the
rumors which were spread by his enemy that he was just a revolutionary, bent on
devastation and blackmail. His soldiers had observed an exemplary discipline, and the
campaigns of 49 were overall a great success.
Another main front which Caesar had to fight on was Africa. This front had a few
wearisome problems with it. The governor P. Attius Varus had declared himself against
Caesar, and the Numidian king, Juba I, was Caesar's personal enemy(Cary 271). Caesar
made a mistake at this point in time because he underrated the strength of his opponent.

He conferred the command against them to the ex-tribune Scribonius Curio, who lacked
military experience, and gave him an army that contained many former soldiers of
Pompey. Encouraged by an early success, which he owed to a surprise landing near Utica,
Curio made a hasty dash into the valley of the Bagradas in pursuit of a Numidian force,
which drew him into an ambuscade. In this disaster Curio himself was killed, and two of
the Cesarean legions were destroyed. His failure to secure Africa in the campaign of 49
had an important significance on the later stages of the civil war, and for the corn
supply. 
But Caesar was able to avoid a food crisis in the capital by speedily taking Sicily and
Sardinia, which the Pompeians abandoned without a struggle. 
Caesar was not just sitting ideally around while the second campaign was in
progress. Instead he himself was focusing most of his and his armies attention on Spain.

In Spain Pompey's deputy-governors, L. Afranius and M. Petreius, commanded a
serviceable army of five legions. To insure himself against the double risk of Afranius
and
Petreius reinforcing Pompey or invading Transalpine Gaul Caesar in person led a force of
six legions against them(Cary 271). The Pompeian army had firmly entrenched itself in a
prepared position at Ilerda in the valley of the Sicoris, which he could not hope to
storm
without heavy losses, and he got into serious difficulties through shortage of supplies
and
the spring flooding of the river. Caesar used his Gallic cavalry to dislodge his enemies,
by
cutting off their supplies; he headed off their retreat to the Ebro by sustained hard
marching. Caesar then threw up a field-works around a steep but waterless hill on which
they had taken refuge and the Pompeians were impelled to surrender themselves. Caesar
had completed a major accomplishment. In only forty days he had completely disposed of 
a large and not unpracticed army lead by two capable commanders(Cary 271). By this
brilliant achievement he overawed the remaining Pompeian forces in Spain, led by Varro,
to a speedy submission. On his back to Italy Caesar received the surrender of Massilia
after a brief fight(Cary).
While all this was going on Pompey had fixed his new headquarters at
Thessalonica. Pompey tried to acquire active assistance from the Parthians but he filed.

All that they would promise to him was benevolent neutrality. On the strength of this
assurance he withdrew the Roman garrisons from the eastern frontiers, so as to make up a
total force of eleven legions(Cary 271-272). By drawing up his forces from the east
Pompey was able to collect a strong corps of horses and a fleet far outnumbering the few
ships of Caesar. At Dyrrhachium on the Adriatic seaboard he formed an advance base for
the recapture of Italy in the following campaign(Cary 272). 
Caesar realized that this would be a very important battle and therefor did not
want to give Pompey the choice of battle-ground. So in early 48 B.C. Caesar carried the
war to the east side of the Adriatic. Because he lacked the transport he was forced to
cast
his troops across in two relays, thus doubling the risks of destruction by winter storms
or
by Pompey's patrols. Caesar was able to cross the first division across untouched, and
after a near-miss escape from a Pompeian blockade squadron M. Antonius rejoined him
with the second installment(Cary 272). Though Pompey had meanwhile concentrated his
forces at Dyrrhachium, he would not venture to expose them in a inclined battle against
the more seasonal troops of Caesar, and therefore failed to crush the two enemy
divisions
before they had joined forces(Cary 272). Caesar now deiced that he would try to cut his
enemies supplies off by a blockade. He soon realized that he was also running short of
supplies and cut back his forces to only the bare minimum to sustain the blockade. 
Because of Pompey's ability to skillfully use his inner position and of his naval
transport
he eventually crumbled one of Caesar's attenuated wings(Cary 273). Caesar was now
caught in the trap which the very wise Pompey had laid. He was now faced with very
little options and a half starved army. But luckily for Caesar Pompey was still reluctant
to
engage in heavy open battle . This made it able for Caesar to slip his army away and
retreat to Thessaly. In Thessaly Caesar was able to provide his troops with provisions
which wee greatly needed and reorganize. But while Caesar was successful in slipping
away he had given the strategic initiative to Pompey. Pompey now had the option to
embark on a reconquest of Italy with almost nothing standing in his way for a total walk
over victory. 
But Pompey judged that his true objective was Caesar himself, so he followed
Caesar to Thessaly. Because Pompey stilled feared open battle with Caesar he used his
superiority in cavalry to cut off Caesar's supplies for a second time and to weaken him
down before closing in on him(Cary 273). There soon arose a major problem in Pompey's
camp. The Roman nobles had returned to camp, over-elated by their sudden good
fortune, counted the victory already theirs. They had also begun to quarrel about who
was going to get what. This put a tremendous amount of pressure on Pompey. As they
had done before the Roman nobles persuaded Pompey to stake everything on a quick
finish(Cary 273). On an open site near Pharsalus he drew a battle-line of 35,000 to
40,000
men, against which Caesar could put no more than 22,000 into the field(Cary 273). 
Pompey had come up with a plan in which he would use his infantry to contain Caesar's
front, and use his powerful mounted force to take him in flank and rear(Cary 273). The
massed cavalry easily overbore Caesar's horse, but was held up by a flank guard of
picked
infantrymen, whom Caesar had instructed to handle their pila as modern infantry uses its
bayonets(Cary 273). By this simple maneuver Caesar's select cohorts turned the tide of
the battle, for the Pompeian horsemen, instead of circling round the obstacle, broke
into
premature flight. Caesar had now brought the fight to a standstill and was able to start
a
pursuit against Pompey. Because his troops were much more seasoned veterans he was
able to dominate the battle and cause Pompey and his forces to flee. The Pompeian
remnant which managed to escape to escape from the camp found a momentary refuge on
the adjacent heights, but here they were cut off by the untiring Caesarians, who
completed
their victory, as at Illerda, by ringing off the fugitives with entrenchments. Caesar
now
claimed a total victory loosing no more than 1,200 men while killing no less 6,000
Pompeians and captured 24,000. The only problem with this victory was that Pompey
himself was able to escape.
After the battle of Pharsalus most of Pompey's generals and admirals surrendered
to Caesar. However in Greece and the Balkins a group of irreconcilable nobles, who had
made good their escape or had been stationed on Pompey's line of communications,
collected the debris of his army and embarked it at the Adriatic ports of Africa. If
Caesar
had massed his men and taken out this last group he could have ended the war for good. 
But he chose instead to lead a pursuit of Pompey, who had fled with a few personal
friends to Egypt, seemingly with a vague hope of entrenching himself there as the
self-invited guest of the young king, Ptolemy XII(Cary 273-274). Caesar's pursuit of
Pompey was not thought to be out of any kind of revenge but instead it was thought that
he aimed to disarm the helpless Pompey and form a partnership in which he would have no
real power(Cary 274).
But Caesar's plans were thwarted by ministers of Ptolemy, who got rid of their
embarrassing visitor by murdering him(Cary 274). For Pompey this piece of foul play was
perhaps kindness in disguise. "Though his last two campaigns had shown that his military
judgment was clear and sound as ever, in the field of politics he had virtually become
the
prisoner of the nobles who drew him into the civil war, and if Caesar had brought him
back to Rome he would have probably been doomed to spend the rest of his life in a
gilled
cage if he had deigned to survive(Cary 274)." For Caesar the death of his foe should
have
been a signal to hasten but he stayed. But none the less the war was thought to be over
for Caesar.
Caesar returned to Rome but only stayed the minimum time which he was needed. 
After easing the economic situation, rewarding his followers and pardoning many
Pompeians who submitted, at the end of 46 B.C. he embarked for a midwinter campaign in
Africa. In Africa the remnants of the Pompeian forces had been pieced together into ten
new legions, to which King Juba brought a reinforcement of four Numidian legions. The
cavalry alone of the Popmeians had been raised to 15,000. Q. Metellus Scipio, the
father-in-law of Pompey, had taken command of this army. But he had "an ace in the
hole" with Labienus, who was a pupil of Caesar and the most likely to beat the master at
his own game(Cary 275).
Caesar used pure genpus to make this campaign a quick a successful one. Because
time was not a luxury which Caesar had he moved his troops by installments in the
intervals between the winter gales(Cary 274). Caesar's main plan was to draw the
Pompeians into an open battle. His opportunity came to him during the siege of a city
called Thapsus, which was situated on a headland in the Tunisian coast and was connected
with the hinterland by two corridors on either side of a wide lagoon(Cary 275). He
allowed himself to be cut off on this tongue of land; but in the making drew his
opponent
to a position where he could not back away from an open battle. The actual battle itself
was not much of a fight as the overpowering forces of Caesar simply ran over the
Pompeian army. But the troops of Caesar refused to give quater and all but a few of the
Pompeian officers were killed and the battle ended in total carnage(Cary 275). 
The civil war demanded one more battle which would proved itself to be the final
blaze of the war. The forces of Pompey's army which had been left behind at Thapsus
were joined by the forces which made it out of Africa which made an army of thirteen
legions. Caesar set out for his fourth winter campaign of the civil war and ventured
just
south of Spain. Caesar realized that this battle could not be won by laying siege to the
Pompeians strongholds so he took the unusual risk of accepting combat on ground which
compelled his legions to deliver their attack uphill(Cary 275). The action of Munda was
one of the hardest fought of Caesar's battles; but in the end the tenth legion overcame
the
Pompeian forces. The Popeian troops were then slaughtered indiscriminately. "In March
of 45 Caesar had become the undisputed master of the Roman Empire(Cary 276)."
Bibliography
Carey, Jack. The Civil war of Caesar, Ny, Ny. 1930