FREE ESSAY ON "GOOD NEIGHBOR" POLICY: IRAN-CONTRA

"GOOD NEIGHBOR" POLICY: IRAN-CONTRA

In 1922 President Franklin Roosevelt introduced the "Good Neighbor" Policy. This policy
was created to keep the United States from getting involved in problems that could and
would occur in Central America. This policy, however, did not stop many government
agencies from interfering and creating a few new problems for United States neighbors. Of
course, all of this was done in an aim to better the political position of the United
States. In 1953, the Central Intelligence Agency created a rumor of an assassination
attempt in Guatemala to run the corrupt government out of the country. This is a perfect
example of the United States sidestepping policy and becoming entangled in Latin American
affairs. History of course, was destined to repeat itself. Only this time, it would be a
scandal that would shake the very foundation of a nation. 
When President Reagan was elected in 1980, he came into office promising to restore
America's military and moral prestige in the world. Voters responded when he pledged to
be tough on terrorists, a vow he repeated time and time again: "Let me further make it
plain to assassins in Beirut and their accomplices, wherever they may be, that America
will never make concessions to terrorists." Was this vow strictly a campaign promise made
that he never intended to honor?
In 1970 in Nicaragua, President Anastasio Somona Debayle fled the country. A civil war
had been devastating the nation's economy. The popular sentiment showed that the public
wanted the Sandinistas. The Sandinistas promised free enterprise but what they brought
was political oppression. The United States tried to form an alliance with them but the
Sandinistas grew closer to the USSR. Many Nicaraguans rejected this government. They
decided to fight back. The rebel Nicaraguans groups that formed was known as the Contras.
President Reagan had long ago taken a stand against the Sandanistan regime. He "embraced"
the opponents of the Sandinistas. The rebels eventually needed "big money" and it was
then that they turned to the United States. In 1981, the United States began to fund the
Contras. The Central Intelligence Agency was the agency most involved. However, public
protests over this aid were very vocal, fearing another Vietnam.
Deep divisions within Congress over the civil war in Nicaragua led to the passage of the
Boland Amendments to the United States Constitution. Boland I was legislation that
essentially "prohibits the CIA from supplying money, arms, training, or support to
individuals or organizations seeking to over throw the Nicaraguan government or to
provoke a military exchange between Nicaragua and Honduras". In October 1984, the Boland
II Amendment passed ending all U.S. assistance to the Contras. This amendment was very
carefully worded because of the dissention in Congress. It states:
During fiscal year 1985, no further funds available to the Central Intelligence Agency,
the Department of Defense, or any other agency or entity of the United States involved
intelligence activities may be obligated or expended for the purpose or which would have
the effect of supporting directly or indirectly, military or para-military operations in
Nicaragua by any nations, group, organization, movement, or individual. 
Funding would have a limit of twenty four million in 1984. The Administration would have
the option to request additional funds from Congress at a later date. Although this cap
was a compromise of sorts between the Reagan Administration and Congress, it would
definitely put the Contra program in jeopardy. In compliance with the law, large numbers
of staff from the CIA and the Defense department were withdrawn from Central America. 
In the wake of the Boland I Amendment and the cap on spending, Robert C. McFarlane,
Reagan's National Security Advisor, suggested soliciting support from other third world
countries. CIA director, William Casey agreed and made several suggestions as to who
should be approached. Contact was then made to solicit said funds. When a one
million-dollar contribution was received in 1984, McFarlane turned to Lieutenant Colonel
Oliver North of the National Security Council to set up bank accounts to move these
monies into Contra hands. Later when the Reagan's Administration was unable to convince
Congress to do away with the twenty-four million-dollar cap on Contra aid, North was
informed that President Reagan wished "the NSC staff had to keep the Contras alive body
and soul." North was instrumental in setting up a covert network, which provided support
to the Contras. 
The sale of arms to Iran was initiated with the dual goal of bettering relations with
Iran and obtaining the release of the American hostages being held in Lebanon by
pro-Iranian terrorists. This was a direct violation of the Boland Amendment.
Nevertheless, a clandestine plan was devised within the United States National Security
Commission to arrange the support. Profits from these sales were then channeled to the
Nicaraguan Contras. The chief negotiator of these deals was North. North reported his
activities initially to McFarlane, the council's head, and subsequently to his successor
Vice Admiral John M. Poindexter. 
These illegal activities all came to light in 1986, causing the Reagan administration
much embarrassment. On October 5, 1986 an Enterprise C-123K plane with lethal supplies
carrying three Americans was brought down by Sandinistas ground fire. The only survivor,
Eugene Hasenfus was captured. He claimed to be working for the CIA. The Sandinistas
confiscated documents connecting the plane with the Nicaraguan Humanitarian Assistance
Office, which President Reagan had established within the State Department in 1985.
Immediately Administrative officials denied Hasenfus claims to be working for the CIA.
They were truthful in this matter. However, the deception continued as they denied having
any knowledge concerning this shipment. 
There was confusion and disarray at the highest levels of government. McFarlane embarked
on a dangerous trip to Tehran under a complete misconception. He thought the Iranians had
promised to secure the release of all hostages before he delivered arms, when in fact
they had promised only to seek the hostages' release, and then only after one planeload
of arms had arrived. In November 1986, an article about McFarlane's trip to Tehran
appeared in a Lebanese newspaper. On November 25, 1986, President Reagan and Attorney
General Edwin Meese announced that indeed proceeds from the Iran arms sales had been
diverted to support the Contras. Poindexter resigned and North was dismissed. 
The United States simultaneously pursued two contradictory foreign policies during the
1980's. The public policy was to observe the letter and spirit of the Boland Amendment's
proscriptions against military or paramilitary assistance to the Contras. The United
States was not to make any concessions for the release of hostages lest such concessions
encourage more hostages taking. Arms shipments to Iran were banned and other Governments
were urged to observe this embargo. Measures were to be taken to improve relations with
Iraq. Finally, the public policy, which was embodied in Executive Order 12333, was to
conduct covert operations solely through the CIA or other organs of the intelligence
community specifically authorized by the President. 
The United States was secretly selling sophisticated missiles to Iran and promising more.
It was during this time that the United States covertly shared military intelligence on
Iraq with Iran. North told the Iranians, (in contradiction to United States policy) that
the United States would help promote the overthrow of the Iraqi head of government. The
NSC staff was secretly assuming direction and funding of the Contras' military effort.
The CIA and the White House were secretly withholding from Congressional Committees all
information concerning the Iran initiative and the Contra support network. Although the
NSC was not so authorized, the NSC staff secretly became operational and used private,
non-accountable agents to engage in covert activities.
It was these Contradictions in policy inevitably resulted in policy failure. The United
States armed Iran, including its most radical elements, but attained neither a new
relationship with that hostile regime nor a reduction in the number of American hostages.
The arms sales did not lead to a moderation of Iranian policies. Moderates did not come
forward, and Iran to this day sponsors actions directed against the United States in the
Persian Gulf and elsewhere. 
The United States opened itself to blackmail by adversaries who might reveal the secret
arms sales and who, according to North, threatened to kill the hostages if the sales
stopped. The United States undermined its credibility with friends and allies, including
moderate Arab states, by its public stance of opposing arms sales to Iran while
undertaking such arms sales in secret. A ten million-dollar contribution to the Contras
from the Sultan of Brunei was lost by directing it to the wrong bank account - the result
of an improper effort to channel that humanitarian aid contribution into an account used
for lethal assistance. Members of this covert operation sought illicit funding for the
Contras through profits from the secret arms sales. A substantial portion of those
profits ended up in the personal bank accounts of the private individuals executing the
sales - while the exorbitant amounts charged for the weapons inflamed the Iranians with
whom the United States was seeking a new relationship.
Undoubtedly, the record of the Iran-Contra Affair also shows a seriously flawed policy
making process. The President first told the Tower Board that he had approved the initial
shipments to Iran through the Israelis. Later he told the Tower Board that he had not.
Finally, he told the Tower Board that he did not know whether he approved the initial
Israeli arms shipments, and his top advisers disagree on the question. 
Pervasive dishonesty and secrecy characterized the Iran-Contra Affair. North admitted
that he and other officials lied repeatedly to Congress and to the American people about
the Contra covert action and Iran arms sales. North testified before Congress "I will
tell you right now, counsel, and all the members here gathered, that I misled the
Congress." He admittedly altered and destroyed official documents. North's testimony
demonstrates that he also lied to members of the Executive branch, including the Attorney
General, and officials of the State Department, CIA and NSC.
As new details of the scandal came to light, investigations began. Reagan created a board
of inquiry headed by former Texas Senator John Tower. Congress initiated an investigation
by independent counsel. President Reagan and his cabinet were chastised for their lack of
control over the National Security Council. In the end, it was decided that President
Reagan was in the long run responsible for his Administration's actions. However, there
was no concrete evidence that he was aware of the diversion of funds to the Contras.
Despite several inconsistencies in comparing his own stories with that of his staff,
Ronald Reagan himself never really faced any charges. 
When Reagan took office, his pledge to restore America's military and moral prestige in
the world reestablished the confidence of the American people. The Iran Contra Scandal
seriously weakened his Administration. This scandal undermined the balance of power
between Congress and the President of the United States. This balance of power is a
safeguard. It guards against individuals whose lust for power overrides their moral
wisdom. The Constitution is "our defense against ourselves, the one foe who might defeat
us." 
Bibliography
1.) Bill Moyers, The Secret Government:The Constitution in Crisis. (Cabin John,
MD:Washington DC, 1988) 
2.) Lawrence E. Walsh., Final Report of the Independent Counsel for Iran Contra Matters:
Investigations and Prosecutions (Washington, DC 1993) 
3.) Peter Kornbluh and Malcolm Byrne, The Iran-Contra Scandal: The Declassified History
(New York: The New Press, 1993 ) 
4.) Miroff, Bruce (1999) Reagan and the Iran-Contra Affair: The Politics of Presidential
Recovery. Presidential Studies Quarterly. 4(29), 949-950
5.) Micheal Lynch and David Bogen, The Spectacle of History: Speech Text and Memory at
the Iran-Contra Hearings (Durham: Duke University Press, 1996)
6.) Ledeen, Michael A., Perilous Statecraft (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1988)
7.) Draper, Theodore, A Very Thin Line: The Iran-Contra Affairs (New York: Hill and Wang,
1991)
8.) William S Cohen and George J. Mitchell, Men of Zeal (New York: Viking, 1988)