FREE ESSAY ON HANNIBAL

HANNIBAL

Since his meteoric life and tragic death, Hannibal Barca comes across the centuries as the
military commander with few, if any equals. A courageous leader, brilliant tactician, and
steadfast soldier in the service of his beloved Carthage, Hannibal existed for one sole
purpose: to defeat and, if possible, to eliminate the power of Rome(Livy p.207). 
Hannibal's destiny was already chosen for him before his own birth. The only thing that
couldn't have been foretold was the outcome of his struggles. His father Hamilcar Barca,
another fearless commander from Carthage, was in charge during the first Punic War.
Hannibal was taken to Spain at the young age of only nine. There he was forced to swear
hostility to Rome. From his fathers death to his own death Hannibal was constantly
involved in a struggle between Carthage and Rome. 
Hannibal was placed in the army as soon as his father felt he was old enough to start his
vigorous training. He learned to handle arms as skillfully as any soldier does, and he
never asked his soldiers to do something that he himself could not do. In 221 BC,
Hasdrubal was assassinated, and Hamilcar died in battle in 229 BC. The young Hannibal was
given his first command, at the age of twenty-six. Hannibal was now the
commander-in-chief, and the Carthaginian government ratified his position. He was a
brilliant well-liked leader form the start. "The veterans thought that in Hannibal,
Hamilcar had returned to life. They noted the same energy in Hannibal's face, the same
keen glance. He was absolutely fearless in going into danger, very prudent when it was on
hand. No amount of labor fatigued him, physically or mentally. He endured heat and cold
very well. What time remained over when his tasks were done he gave to rest. Many times
the soldiers saw him lying on the ground amid the outposts and the guards, wrapped in a
military cloak"(Miller et al Livy p.41). 
Before the death of Hasdrubal, Carthage had negotiated a treaty with Rome to establish a
line of Demarcation on the Ebro River. This treaty led to Hannibal's first military
action. Saguntum, which was located well south of the line, became the center of Roman
ambitions. Saguntum's leaders began attacking nearby Cartheginian allies and expelling
supporters. The city of Saguntum was well inside the Carthaginian influence, but the
Romans demanded that Carthage not take action at Sanguntum. Hannibal ignored Roman
demands and decided to take action on the city. Hannibal organized his armies and threw a
siege on Saguntum. The city was greatly reduced and Hannibal began his amazing trip over
the Alps.
According to H.L. Oerter of Miami University, Hannibal's journey, including 40 elephants,
over and through the Alps into Italy has never been denied. But, there has been no
generalized agreement on the route that he followed. It is known that two Greek scholars
accompanied Hannibal's forces, but their accounts have never been found. 
A Roman army under the command of General Publius Cornelius Scipio was sent to meet and
dispose of Hannibal, but failed to come across the great leader. Scipio did finally meet
Hannibal at the Ticinus River. The meeting was accidental. Forces from both sides met,
and the Carthaginians came out of the battle victorious. Scipio was badly wounded and
nearly lost his life. The Romans retreated to Placentia, where Longus would reinforce
them. Fighting on the left bank of the Trebia River the Romans were again soundly
defeated. Hannibal advanced to the Arno River by spring. 
In 217 BC, Hannibal moved on to Perugia and forced the Roman Flaminius into open combat,
at the battle of Lake Trasimene. The Carthaginians nearly annihilated Flaminius, killing
thousands and forcing others to drown in the lake. Rome sent reinforcements to Flaminius
but Carthage intercepted and destroyed them also. That same year Rome elected Quintus
Fabius Maximus Cunctator's dictator who adopted the Fabian tactic of delay. This tactic
only allowed small skirmishes between the two armies. 
In 216, Hannibal made his move south and seized the army supply depot at Cannae on the
Aufidus River. Here, in August, The Battle of Cannae was fought. While the Guals and
Iberian infantry of Hannibal's center line yielded before the drive of the numerically
superior Roman infantry, the Libyan infantry and cavalry of Hannibal's flanks stood fast,
overlapped the Roman line, an in a rear encircling movement turned to pursue the
victorious legionaries(Khalaf p.2). This great land victory brought the desired effect,
but Hannibal did not march on Rome and decided to spend the winter of 216-215 in Capua.
Carthaginian fighting strength was beginning to weaken. Realizing this the Romans began
to put the strategy suggested by Fabius into operation. Fabius's suggestions consisted
of: to defend the cities loyal to Rome; to try to recover, where opportunity offered it
but rather to keep the Carthaginians alert in every theatre of war. Hannibal, due to
inferior numbers wasn't able to spread his forces to match the Romans or throw his
concentrated strength into a decisive battle, turned the tides from offensive to
defensive in Italy. Hannibal gained only minor victories, except for the capture of
Tarentum, for the next two years. 
In 213 Casilinum and Apri were recovered by the Romans, and in 211 Hannibal had to march
to Capua to relieve the Roman siege. Despite his hurried march, Capua fell to the Romans
before Hannibal could save the city. In that same year Syracuse fell, and in 209 Tarentum
had also been recovered by the Romans. 
Roman success in Spain brought severe blows to Carthaginian power there. To save their
territories in Italy, Hasdrubal assembled a force of soldiers from the main Carthaginian
army to cross the Alps and come to Hannibal's aid. Before the Carthaginian armies could
meet, Hasdrubal's army was defeated at Metaurus in Italy. Hannibal's last hope of making
a recovery in Italy was destroyed. Hannibal placed his forces in Bruttium, along with his
remaining allies, to resist the Romans for 4 more years. Hannibal had to abandon Italy in
203, in order to save his country from Scipio Africanas. 
By the time Hannibal had arrived home, Carthage had already negotiated a peace treaty
with Rome. When Hannibal arrived they violated the treaty for one last stance against the
Romans. According to S. G. Khalaf accounts of the campaigns that followed differ greatly.
Both Hannibal and Scipio, in order to link up with their respective Numidian allies,
moved up the Bagradas River to the region of Zama Regia. Hannibal was now deficient in
cavalry; the mercenary troops of his front line and the African infantry of his second
line together were routed, and Scipio, seeing that Hannibal's third line, the veteran
soldiers, was still intact, reformed his front and brought up the Numinian cavalry of
Masinissa, his Numidian ally, in the Carthaginian rear. Hannibal lost 20,00 men in
defeat, but he himself escaped Masinissa's pursuit. Scipio had won the battle of Zama.
A treaty between Rome and Carthage was made within a year after the Battle. Although
accused of having misconducted the war, he was made a suffete (a civil magistrate) and
kept his military command. Hannibal soon became unpopular with a certain group of
Carthaginian nobility and fled to the court of Antiochus at Ephesus, where Ephesus was
planning to wage war against the Romans. Inexperienced Ephesus was defeated in his first
two battles, and the Romans demanded that Hannibal surrender. When Hannibal heard of this
he fled to either of two places: Crete to the court of King Prusias, or he joined the
rebel forces in Armenia.
Finally the Romans by unknown means got themselves into a position to demand the
surrender of Hannibal. Hannibal was unable to escape this time, so he poisoned himself in
the village of Libyssa. The year is uncertain, but it was probably 183. 
Hannibal throughout his life was a military genius. He had a great personality and was
very persuasive. It was said that he could get any man to fight for him. Hannibal did
what not many could do, defeat the Romans time and time again. His military victories
brought him so close to beating the Romans, but he never had the chance to finally
destroy Rome. "His examples in war have sometimes been applied, with success, to destroy
greater evils than he could have imagined or understood, In this sense, so longs as war
remains an instrument of policy, he was a creator and not a destroyer"(Cottrell p 248).
Bibliography 
Bradford, D. S. (1998). Hannibal. In The encyclopaedia Britannica (Vol.5, pp.683-685).
Chicago, IL: Encyclopaedia Britannica.
Cottrel, L. (1965). Hannibal: Enemy of Rome. New York, NY: Holt, Rinehart and Winston.
Khalaf, S. G. (1999, January 25). Colonial Punic Wars and Hannibal [On-line]. Available:
http://phoenicia.cnchost.com/punicwar.html
Livy, T. (1994). Hannibal. In Historical world leaders: Europe A-K (Vol.1, pp.207-211).
Detriot, MI: Gale Research.
Miller, O. B. (1953). A picturesque tale of progress. Chicago, IL: The Book House of
Children.