FREE ESSAY ON THE FOUNDATION OF POWER AND JUSTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW

THE FOUNDATION OF POWER AND JUSTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW

Thucydides wrote The History of the Peloponnesian War believing that it was a good picture
of the past and which (human nature being what it is) will, at some time or other and in
much the same way, be repeated in the future." This paper will present a comparison
between the time of Thucydides and how the International system has reflected certain
aspects that are contained in the document. It will attempt to address the possibilities
of oncoming systemic war, concepts of trust, and the earlier statement of Thucydides.
Terms that are important to this argument are anarchy, security dilemma, and balance of
powers. Anarchy is the system that world politics works under: with the presence of no
prominent authority, any state can do what it chooses on the international stage. The
notion of security dilemma rises out of the fear of other states building up their forces
and becoming a larger threat to all of the other states. The tie between anarchy,
security dilemma, and life in a sovereign state is the balance of powers; which aims at
primarily to preserve peace and the status quo. 
Thucydides' balance of power involved two states: Athens and Sparta. After the Persian
war, Athens had become a very powerful military state, and began to assimilate other
states they had recently saved in the Persian War. Athens justified their actions by
suggesting that, having won the war, their rights to become an empire were prevelent.
They then built walls around their new territories and continued to increase their
military power. This worried the Spartans because if Athens were to attack them it would
be difficult to counter attack. Sparta, however, did not respond by building up their
forces to maintain the balance. The Spartans acted slowly and tried to avoid the
conflict. However, when the smaller states went to Sparta and pleaded for aid, the
Spartans agreed, to defend against hostile Athenian actions. Sparta and its smaller
allies soon engaged the Athenians and were eventually victorious over the Athenian threat
of hegemony. The underling cause of Spartan engagement originated in the pleas of the
fleeing allied city-states. They claimed that since Sparta was the only other major power
that it was Sparta's duty to protect the smaller states. These states also created the
fear in the Spartans that Athenians would develop enough power to create a hegemony, and
that they all would lose their sovereignty. They stated that an Athenian attack was
inevitable. The Spartans began to position troops to defend themselves, as it was better
military strategy to stop Athenian forces before they gained any more power. This was
considered an aggressive act by the Athenians and sparked the beginnings of the
Athenian-Spartan conflict. 
In comparison, Europe of the 19th century involved five major powers England, France,
Russia, Austria, and Prussia. These five powers through communication and shared interest
created a system in which they managed to maintain stable international relations. The
larger powers were responsible for maintaining the independence of the smaller states'
sovereignty. This system, though there were many small wars over territory and
maintaining the balance, managed to avoid any systemic wars for ninety years after the
Napoleonic war. In this alliance, England had taken on the role of a balancer and joined
any side necessary to maintain the balance. The European system ran on many concepts that
allowed for its stability. Their system was designed to ensure that all independent
states would survive, preserve the system, and that none would control the others. The
nature of their trust allowed each state to maintain a balance of power where none had to
worry about the rise of hegemony. War was inevitable on a small scale to maintain the
balance and status quo; however, due to the nature of the structure, the group's interest
superseded the need for any state to take over others. 
Thucydides was correct in his assumption that some of his understanding of human nature
would last through into the future. The structure of the system in both examples are
remarkably similar even after almost two thousands years they still have many of the same
underling principles. In both systems, the main powers were responsible for the weaker
states. Since the security dilemma was a concern of all the states, they mostly all
strove to maintain the balance and ensure their survival. However trust and the
inevitability of war differ greatly. This was most likely due to the differences in
polarity of the structure. 
The Greek city-states were bipolar having only two main powers in the area. This was
quite different than Europe's multi-polar system of five main powers. The actual
political differences arose out of the availability of trust. Athens and Sparta had no
other major powers to rely on if the other state became too strong. It was up to the two
states to control the system. Whenever any action was carried out by one of the states,
the other would become immediately concerned. However, in the Multi-polar system if one
state begins to become too threatening, one or more of the other states could be trusted
to unite and control the first power. This concept present in the multi-polar
international stage managed to keep all states relatively equal and make a large systemic
war very implausible. The one systemic conquest in the European system was that of
Napoleon's French nationalist. Napoleon no longer saw that the balance of power was in
France's best interests, and therefore went against it. The Napoleonic war would not have
succeeded if not for the rise of French nationalism, which created a much stronger
attacking force than any of the other powers combined. In addition, Napoleon's brilliant
ideas of foreign conquest played heavily in his success. Napoleon was eventually brought
down because the other powers in the system united against him. After Frances defeat, the
European system brought France back to an equal power and restored the balance of the
five powers. 
It appears that Thucydides was unable to predict the effects of human nature in a system
other than a bipolar one. The same underling concepts of governments in an anarchical
system were present but it was dealt with differently in the new order. Europe's five
powers were able to develop more trust and have less fear of systemic wars. Is Thucydides
work therefore useless in modern international politics? Not at all, as it still clearly
underlines the basics affects of anarchy, the importance of self-sovereignty, and the
security dilemma. 
Bibliography
Thucydides. History of the Peloponnesian War. Penguin. New York: 1972 Gulick, Edward.
Europe's Classical Balance of Power. Norton. New York: 1967