FREE ESSAY ON THE LONG MARCH

THE LONG MARCH

INTRODUCTION
On October 16, 1934, 100 000 Chinese Communist troops set out on a 6,000 mile trek from
their base in Kiangsi.1 This trek, later to be known as the Long March, began after
Chiang Kai-shek and his Nationalist armies (the Kuomintang) frustrated the Communist
organization in Southeast China. The Long March was a difficult journey; approximately
90,000 men and women died before it was over.2 However, communism was not eliminated in
China. This paper argues that the Long March galvanized commitment to the communist cause
and thus, was the key precursor to the eventual victory of the Communist Party in China
in 1949. By narrowly escaping defeat and destruction through the Long March, the
Communists were able to re-build support to fight the Nationalists once again, and this
time they won.
THE CHINESE REVOLUTION AND SUN YAT SEN
The Chinese Revolution began in 1911 with the overthrow of the Manchu government and the
establishment of the New Republic of China. Before the Revolution, the Chinese lived
mainly in competing clans and were ruled by rival war lords. During China's long history,
its people had never functioned as one cohesive unit. Because of the threat of Japan,
Great Britain, and the Industrial Revolution, China needed to become a stronger unit. The
unification of China was an important development for a number of reasons. Most important
was that unification served to defend China against Japanese invasion and also set the
stage for a national economy. China was extremely xenophobic, and the beauracracy did not
want to change. Some individuals, however, dreamed of a united Chinese nation, and it was
this dream that encouraged the revolutionaries in China. Of these individuals, the most
important was Sun Yat Sen, the ''Father of Republican China.'' Sun was born on November
12, 1866 in the southern province of Guangdong.3 At age thirteen Sun went to live with
his brother in Honolulu, Hawaii where he attended a missionary school. After four years
in Hawaii, Sun moved to Hong Kong where he studied medicine. However, at age twenty-eight
Sun returned to Hawaii, and left the medical profession for politics. After the defeat of
China in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895, Sun returned to Guangdong. During the next
sixteen years, he began to develop his revolutionary ideas. He attracted many supporters,
financial and otherwise, and staged a number of unsuccessful attempts to overthrow the
Manchu government. Sun realized that the only way to ensure China's survival as a country
was to make radical changes inside the government. He felt that it was imperative for
China to ''westernize'' in terms of scientific and social progress.4 In 1905, Sun
established the T'ung-meng Hui (United Revolutionary League) that was based on his
''Three Principles of the People.'' His three principles were: Nationalism: to supersede
the narrow provincial and clan loyalties of the Chinese; Democracy: to carry into
national life the self-governing processes prevalent in the villages and; People's
Well-Being: to improve the material standards of the ordinary man's life.5 Sun Yat Sen's
dream of a new republic was not fulfilled until October 10, 1911.
By 1916 Sun Yat Sen was the President of the New Republic of China. During his reign, Sun
founded the Kuomintang (Nationalist Party), which had support from not only the Soviet
Party but the Communist Party in China as well. In 1924, Sun admitted the Chinese
Communists into the Nationalist Party. During his career, Sun attempted to unify all of
China. Sun Yat Sen died on March 12, 1925 with his dream of unification unfulfilled. With
the death of Sun Yat Sen, internal struggles plagued the Kuomintang and the Chinese
Communist Party. During these struggles Chiang Kai-Shek emerged as chief of the National
Revolutionary Army.
CHIANG KAI-SHEK AND THE DREAM OF A UNIFIED CHINA
The dream of a unified China did not die with Sun Yat Sen. Chiang Kai-Shek was heavily
influenced by him. Chiang was born October 31, 1887 in the coastal province of Chekiang.
Unlike Sun Yat Sen, Chiang was born to wealthy parents. In 1906 he began his military
career in Northern China at the Paoting Military Academy. After one year, he began his
four year military education in Japan. Chiang served in the Japanese army from 1909-1911,
but when he received word of the uprisings in China, he returned home and began to try to
overthrow the Manchu government. By 1918, Chiang Kai-Shek was a member of the Kuomintang.
Chiang, along with Sun Yat Sen, believed in the unification of China.
While visiting the Soviet Union for the first time in 1923, Chiang studied not only the
Soviet institutions but the Red Army as well. Upon returning from his visit in the Soviet
Union, Chiang became a ''commandant of a military academy, established on the Soviet
model, at Whampoa near Canton.''6 The admission of the Chinese Communists into the
Kuomintang which occurred during Sun Yat Sen's presidency, later became a great problem
for Chiang Kai Shek. There were tensions among the two parties that outweighed any
positive factors of the alliance. The far right of the Kuomintang and the far left of the
Chinese Communists rarely ever agreed. The collaboration between the two parties was
essential for the overthrowing of the warlord regime during the Northern Expedition in
1927, but as soon as that was over, the two parties did not need one another anymore.
According to Wilson:
While the Party Central Committee respected the motion of the Internationale, most of the
comrades had only approved a democratic revolutionary united front and were quite
doubtful about entering the Kuomintang. [The] Chinese Communist Party was able to pursue
its goal of organizing mass support under the Kuomintang umbrella -- and retained control
of this organization after the united front collapsed.''7
Tensions mounted between the Nationalist Party and the Chinese Communist Party until 1927
when Chiang finally expelled the Communists from his party. At this time, Chiang lost the
support of the Soviet Union.
While Chiang was struggling to deal with the Chinese Communist Party, he was also working
to unify all of China. A large number of warlords maintained control over their lands and
the people on them. Facing the imminent invasion of the Japanese, the pressure to quickly
unite China into one cohesive unit was immense. In 1926 Chiang began a campaign against
the warlords in the northern part of the country. After two years, the fighting ended
when the Nationalist Party entered the capital, Peking. Chiang then established a new
central government at Nanking. Although Chiang was the leader of the government he still
did not have complete control. The warlords in the northern part of the country and the
Chinese Communists were still opposed to Chiang Kai Shek. Facing the war with Japan in
1931, Chiang decided not to resist the Japanese invasion until he defeated the Chinese
Communists.8 At this time, he launched a number of encirclement campaigns in an attempt
to defeat the Communists in their base area on the Kiangsi-Fukien border. The Communists,
using guerrilla warfare, successfully fought off the Kuomintang four times. But in 1934,
they finally lost their base to the Nationalists. Chiang believed that when the
Kuomintang captured the Communist base that the Communists would give up. Instead, they
abandoned their base and began a long trek from one side of China to the other.
MAO ZEDONG AND THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY
Mao Zedong, the eventual Chairman of the New Republic of China did not allow the
Communists to disappear. He helped ensure the survival of 8% of the 100,000 troops who
undertook the Long March.9 Mao was born on December 26, 1893 in the Hunan Province of
China to peasants who had prospered by hard work. Mao was rebellious by nature and left
his father's farm early in life to attend school. Upon graduating from normal school in
1918, Mao went to Peking where he worked as a library assistant. He met two men in Peking
who influenced him: Li Ta-chao and Ch'en Tu-hsiu. These men, ''whose social criticism
drew him into their orbit,'' were the founders of the Chinese Communist Party in 1921.10
During the next few years, Mao held various positions in the Chinese Communist Party
until 1927. He began to realize that the ''major force'' in China was discontentment of
the peasants and he wrote a report ''which constituted one of his major contributions to
Chinese Communism.''11 Mao believed that the peasants should own their own land and not
be responsible for land that is not theirs. He thought that millions of peasants would
''rise like a tornado or tempest, a force so extraordinarily swift and violent that no
power, however great, will be able to suppress it.''12 Mao organized the Autumn Harvest
rebellions hoping that the peasants would be particularly unhappy and angry at their
government. He planned a military uprising at Nanchang, and hoped that ''the Red Armies
under Ho Lung, Yeh Ting and other Communist guerrilla chieftains [would] then ... march
triumphantly on Canton to establish a new revolutionary government.''13 However, the
victory and eventual capture of Nanchang never occurred. The peasants did not have the
interest that Mao believed they had in revolting against Chiang Kai Shek. Mao was
captured and had to bribe his way out of captivity, eventually leading some of his troops
to the mountains of Chingkangshan on the border of Hunan and Kiangsi. Because of Mao's
unfortunate handling of the Autumn Harvest Uprising he was expelled from the Politburo.
Mao began to lose ''favour with the Communist Party leadership.''14 The intellectuals who
ran the party were unhappy with Mao's obsession with, ''confiscating the landlords' land
in Hunan.''15 
In spite of the Party leaders' disillusionment with Mao, he began to build power among
the peasants in Chingkangshan. Mao Zedong and Chu Teh ''steadily extended the territory
under their control, and the Mao-Chu group began to go by the name of the 'Real Power
Faction.' ''16 In June 1930 the Central Committee ordered the Red Armies ''to integrate
themselves under Mao's and Chu's command, to leave their rural bases and to launch
attacks on a number of nearby industrial cities, notably Wuhan and Changsha.''17 Both Chu
Teh and Mao knew that this plan was not best for the Party, but they were unable to
reject it. The Red Army was no match for the Kuomintang and Mao and Chu ''withdrew their
troops and reorganized at Kian in Kiangsi, determined to rebuild the rural base from
which they believed they could, over the longer term, erode the power of the
Kuomintang.''18 
Because of the defeat of the Red Army by the Kuomintang, the leader, Li Li-san was
replaced. Morale was very low among the peasants, which eventually led to Mao's
leadership of the Chinese Communist Party.
Mao became Political Commissar of the Fourth Red Army with Chu Teh as Commander-in-Chief.
This army was set up in such a way that it was a paid service and had rations. The army
also followed Mao's ''Three Rules of Discipline (obey orders, don't take anything from
workers or peasants, and hand in everything taken from local landlords and gentry) and
Eight Additional Rules (put back the doors you use for bed-boards, replace the straw
borrowed for bedding, speak politely, pay fairly for what you buy, return everything you
borrow, pay for anything you damage, don't bathe in the sight of women, and don't search
the pockets of captives).''19 Mao's discipline and organizational habits were
instrumental in the success of the Chinese Communist Party. Over the next few years more
people began to respect Mao and his beliefs. He gradually gained supporters not only in
the Red Army but also in the Chinese Communist Party.
In 1931 Mao ordered the arrest of more than four thousand men because he believed that
they were involved secretly with the Kuomintang.20 Mao wanted to purge his army of anyone
that was not with him and the Chinese Communists one hundred percent. Liu Ti, an officer
with the Red Army, freed these prisoners who in turn killed approximately one hundred of
Mao's disciples.21 The Politburo did not look favorably on Mao's tough actions during
this mutiny and he again fell out of favor with the Politburo and was replaced by Chou
En-lai. 
During this time of political unrest in the Red Army, Chiang Kai-shek began the first of
his five encirclement campaigns to defeat the Chinese Communist Party. The Communists won
the first four of these campaigns due to their guerrilla warfare tactics, but by the
fifth encirclement campaign in August 1933, Chaing Kai-shek was prepared. There were one
million troops, an immense arsenal and four hundred airplanes at Chiang's disposal.22 The
campaign was interrupted, however, after the troops of the Nineteenth Route Army became
dissatisfied with Chiang and his policy of ''pacifying the Chinese interior before
turning to deal with the Japanese, even though they had themselves fought against the
Communists in the past.''23 This ordeal caused a great pause in the fifth encirclement
campaign and fighting did not resume until August of 1934. Mao and Chu Teh both agreed
that the
Red Army should break through the ever-tightening Kuomintang circle, split into small
units and fight guerrilla campaigns in the areas to the north and east of the enemy lines
where there were no blockhouses.24
Li Teh (also known as Otto Braun), who had the confidence of the world Communist leaders,
rejected Mao and Chu Teh's advice and said that the base should be defended using
trenches, positional combat and blockhouses. This strategy proved fatal for the Chinese
Communist Party. On October 16, 1934 the remaining survivors of the Kuomintang offensives
began the ''most extraordinary march in human history.''25
THE LONG MARCH
On October 16, 1934, 100 000 troops set out on a trek from the southern part of China to
the northern part of China.26 This ''long march'' took one year and many troops perished.
It was clear to Mao and his fellow comrades that they had to leave Kiangsi or face
annihilation. As the remaining troops of Chinese Communist soldiers set out on their long
journey, morale was exceedingly low. Twenty thousand troops were injured and had to be
left behind in Kiangsi.27 Many of the people who stayed behind were captured and
eventually killed. One of those killed was Mao's brother, Mao Tse-tan.
Conditions on the march were very primitive, causing many of the troops to die of
disease. There were no medicines, hospitals or ammunition and a good number of the guns
became useless. The troops were forced to fast for days at a time. Despite these horrible
circumstances, the troops became very tough and courageous soldiers.
Reports in the United States varied as to the information of the Nationalists' success in
Kiangsi. In a November 19, 1934 article in the New York Times, the AP reported: ''The
Chinese Communists continued their slow movement westward, engaging frequently with
troops. The Communist strength is estimated at about 50,000.''28 In a November 20, 1934
article in the New York Times Hallett Abend reported that ''The main Communist force,
exceeding 100 000 a year ago, has now been reduced to about 10,000.''29
Mao was unable to start the march with the troops on October 16, 1934 due to a serious
attack of malaria. When Mao was able to join his troops he rode on horseback most of the
time. Other than Mao, the only other person who did not walk was Li Teh (Otto Braun).
According to Dick Wilson's The Long March, ''He would never march, and either rode a
horse along the route or else, if it were a long stretch, would be carried on a wooden
litter by four carriers.''30 It is clear, though, that this exhausting journey was not a
luxurious time. Every soldier on the march was ''dressed and equipped the same.''31
After three horrible months of defeats and deaths, the Chinese Communist Party finally
gained the upper hand. In early January 1935, the Chinese Communist Party took control
over Tsunyi in the Kweichow Province. The Communist Party decided to rest in Tsunyi while
a meeting of the Politburo of the Party Central Committee was convened. It was in Tsunyi
that Mao regained his control of the Chinese Communist Party, ''thereafter its dominating
personality ... who led it into power fifteen years later.''32 This was an important time
not only for Mao but for his troops as well. ''The Tsunyi Resolutions adopted on January
8, 1935 constitute[d] the most important document to be produced on the Long March.''33
This document states that the leadership under Po Ku of the Politburo and Li Teh of the
Military Commission was condemnable. Po Ku's famous slogan of ''Not an inch of Soviet
territory to be lost'' might have been correct politically but applying that to warfare
was a mistake.34 The Po Ku policy of pure defence had meant disposing the Communist
forces so that they could resist attack from all directions, which meant not being strong
enough to resist anywhere and enabling the enemy to destroy the Red units one by one.''35
This was just one of the fourteen resolutions and by the end of the meeting, Po Ku was
''specifically named for ... failing to admit criticism of the overwhelming majority'' of
the conference.36 Mao Zedong summed up the conference by stating:
The enlarged conference of the Politburo points out that the mistakes in the Party's
military leadership in the past were only a partial mistake in the general line of the
Party, which was not enough to cause pessimism and despair. The Party has bravely exposed
its own mistakes. It has educated itself through them and learnt how to lead the
revolutionary war more efficiently towards victory. After the exposure of mistakes, the
Party, instead of being weakened, actually becomes stronger.37
During the Red Army's resting period and conference in Tsunyi, Chiang Kai-shek was trying
to take back the towns that the Red Army had occupied. According to a January 7, 1935
report in the New York Times, ''Serious pressure of outlaw troops of the important city
of Kweiyang, in Kweichow Province of Southwestern China, was reported relieved today by
the arrival of government troop reinforcements rapidly thrust in from Hunan and Kwangsi
Provinces.''38 As reported in the New York Times on January 26, 1935 ''A motley horde of
Chinese peasants, the curiously armed 'Chinese militia,' streamed into Chungking today to
help Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek's Nationalist armies defend Szechwan Province against
Communists.''39 There was increasing hostility and fear among the people in the Kweichow
Province of China that was reduced when the Kuomintang arrived to take back the towns.
After the Tsunyi Conference, Mao was named Chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council
and the entire Council was reorganized. After Tsunyi, Mao was ready to strike. He set up
a new base in Szechuan with the Fourth Front Army which was already established there. In
this new location the Communists would be out of the direct control of the Kuomintang.
Szechuan was an area rich in ''both foodstuffs and minerals.''40 Chiang Kai-shek was
determined to defeat the Red Army and gain control over the southwestern provinces.
Chiang joined forces with the local warlords to try to establish a stranglehold on the
Chinese Communists. In order for the Red Army to gain entry into Szechuan, they needed to
cross the Yangtze River. Reported in the New York Times on February 8, 1935, a special
cable from Nanking relayed:
With the receipt of abundant financial aid the government troops sent to Chungking as the
vanguard of a large-scale movement against Communists in Szechwan Province finally are on
the move ... The Chinese banks' remittance rates have fallen decidedly following the
bolstering of public confidence and the subsiding of the fears of a Communist
incursion.41
After five weeks of attempting to cross the Yangtze, the Red Army retreated and
recaptured the Luoshan Pass and Tsunyi on February 27, 1935, which they had lost several
weeks prior to that.
After a few bitter defeats of Mao's Fourth Front Army by the Kuomintang in Szechuan, the
First Front Army crossed the Wu River and entered Kweiyang, the capital of Kweichow in
April 1935. After Mao's troops arrived at Kweiyang, Chiang sent his Kuomintang troops
there. Unexpectedly, Mao pulled his army out and headed to Yunnan. Mao was a strategist;
and he divided his troops on the way to Yunnan, causing a diversion. Chiang was confident
that he could finish off the Red Army on the banks of the Yangtze, but he underestimated
Mao. The Red Army captured seven enemy ferry boats, ''crossed the Chinsha River at the
Chiaoche Ferry in nine days and nine nights'' and ''extricated itself from the several
hundred thousand Kuomintang troops hot on its heels or trying to intercept and encircle
it.''42
Articles in the New York Times reported over the period of twelve days said, ''As
predicted, the Communists in Northern Kweichow Province are proving a grave menace, and
it is evident that recent Nanking assertions about their elimination are not
justified.''43 Another April 3rd article stated that ''Communists in Kweichow Province
who broke through provincial troops captured today the city of Chihshui, swept south and
occupied Tungtze and Tsunyi and approached within forty miles of Kweiyang, capital of the
province. Although it was believed Kweiyang was in no immediate danger, the populace was
highly excited when reports were received that Communists, numbering about 10 000, were
again swinging southwest into Yunnan Province.''44 On April 5th, 8th and 10th it was
reported that the Red Army's advance has been ''checked.'' By April 15th, the New York
Times reported that the Red Army had occupied the towns of Tingfan, Changchai, Pingchai
and Anshun. Mao Zedong and the Chinese Communist Party were viewed as a group of
miscreants who terrified not only the Chinese but other countries as well.
In May 1935 the Red Army faced its most challenging obstacle in the entirety of the Long
March: the rapid and roaring Tatu River. If the Red Army did not cross successfully, the
Long March would be over. From May 26th to 28th, 1935 the Red Army ferried their troops
across. On the third day the troops were slowed down and the Kuomintang began to bomb the
Red Army from above. At Luting, with the Kuomintang waiting for them on the other side,
the Red Army began to cross the iron chain suspension bridge. All of the planks had been
removed, yet miraculously the Red Army was able to cross it.
After crossing the Tatu River the Red Army was now less than a hundred miles from their
Fourth Front Army in northeastern Szechuan. On the way to the Kansu province, the Red
Army had to go over seven ranges of high mountains. One of these was the Great Snow
Mountain (Chiachinshan). Before the troops made their ascent, they ran into Tibetan
warriors where some fighting occurred. The Red Army troops disarmed and took the
Tibetan's clothing in order to stay warm during their ascent of the Great Snow Mountain.
Mao, who was sick with malaria again, had to rest after ascending sixteen thousand feet,
while Lin Piao, the official historian of the Long March, had both of his legs amputated
due to frostbite.
The troops were exhausted, but they needed to reach the other side in order to connect
with the Fourth Front Army. The troops would march late in the evening so as to avoid
enemy bombing. The rain, snow and fierce wind caused more men to die of exhaustion and
cold. After days of severe weather the Red Army finally reached the sunny summit. After
the Red Army arrived safely in Moukung and reunited with the Fourth Front Army, there
were feelings of uncertainty. During all of the fighting with the Kuomintang there was
some infighting between the First Front Army led by Mao Zedong and the Fourth Front Army
led by Zhang Guotao. Zhang believed that his army was the strongest, most viable army and
deserved to be shown the appropriate amount of respect. On June 25, 1935 the Politburo
held a conference in Lianghekou trying to plan the tasks of the Communists after the
conference. After the Lianghekou conference was over there were five resolutions, three
of which are as follows: 1) After the union of the First and Fourth Red Front Armies, our
strategic policy is to apply our main forces to attack at the north, to destroy the enemy
in large numbers in mobile warfare, to take over southern Gansu first and then to create
the Sichuan-Shaanxi-Gansu Soviet Base. Thus, we will put the Chinese Soviet movement on a
firmer and broader base foundation or foothold in order to strive for victory in the
northwestern provinces and eventually in all China; 2)To realize this strategic policy,
tactically, we must concentrate our main forces to destroy Hu Zongnan's troops, to
capture Songpan and control the region north of Songpan in order to achieve a successful
march to southern Gansu; 3) One minor part of the Red Army should be dispatched to the
Yao and Xia Rivers to control this region so that we can back on the vast area of Gansu,
Qinghai, Ningxia and Xinjiang provinces, which would be to the benefit of development
toward the east.45
After all the discussions, the conference concluded with no decisive resolution. Mao
asked Zhang, ''How about leaving the matter for further consideration?''46 This did not
calm down Zhang for long, though. It has been shown that at the time of the union between
these two armies that there were ten to fifteen thousand troops in the First Front Army
and sixty to seventy thousand in the Fourth Front Army. Zhang was displeased with the
conference in June because he believed that it favored the Central Red Army and Mao
Zedong. A battle plan called ''Operation of the Songpan Battle'' stated that the Red Army
in its entirety needed to march north to capture the city of Songpan in order to pass to
Gansu.47 Zhang was extremely reluctant to follow these orders because he had not voted
for these plans and did not wish to sacrifice his own men. Mao's troops rushed to Songpan
but, as he did not want to fight the battle alone, he had to stop and renegotiate with
Zhang. In mid July, Zhang and Mao met in Luhua where there was another conference. This
conference was more about who could assert the most power rather than about finding a
viable solution to their problem. The result of the Luhua conference was as follows:
Zhang Guotao obtained the de facto control of the Army leadership ... The Front
Headquarters was in charge of combat operations; its commander and political commissar
were both from the Fourth Front Army.
As for Mao, his membership in the Three-Man-Group was automatically dropped, his
assistantship to Zhou in military affairs was even more out of the question, and his
former position as Political Commissar of the Front Headquarters was given to Chen
Ghanghao. In other words, Mao lost all his titles and power in the Red Army.48
Mao was extremely uncomfortable with his loss of position in the Red Army, but he was
still very influential in the Party Center and was considered the spokesman for the First
Front Army. Zhang was unhappy with this because he could not assert control over the
First Front Army with Mao still as influential as he was. Zhang and his men also had
designs on positions in the Party Center, so another conference was called to discuss
these issues.
On August 5th and 6th, 1935 a Politburo conference convened at Shawo. This meeting has
been considered the ''most important event in the reunion of the First and Fourth Front
Armies.''49 The conference at Shawo was the first conference since Tsunyi to seriously
deal with political issues. A part of the final Resolution of the Shawo Conference reads
as follows:
The fraternal solidarity of the First and Fourth Front Armies is a necessary condition
for fulfilling our historical mission of creating the Sichuan- Shaanxi-Gansu Soviet and
establishing the Chinese Soviet Republic. All those tendencies, intentional or
unintentional, toward breaking the solidarity of the First and Fourth Front Armies can
only be harmful to the Red Army and beneficial to the enemy.
It should be made clear to each individual comrade that both the First and Fourth Front
Armies are constituents of the Chinese Worker and Peasant Red Army, and both were under
the leadership of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. There are only
class love and aid between us, not divergence and contradiction. Only in this way can the
union of the First and Fourth Front Armies be firm and lasting, can we combine into one
unit to defeat our class enemy.50 
While all of this infighting was going on, Chiang Kai-shek was slowly encircling the Red
Army to prevent it from re-entering eastern Sichuan. The Red Army was surrounded on every
side, except to the west due to limiting terrain, and the Kuomintang patiently waited.
Mao took the ''First and Third Army Groups of the First Front Army and the Fourth and
Thirtieth Armies of the Fourth Front Army'' on the eastern route, while Zhang took the
''Ninth and Thirty-first Armies of the Fourth Army and the Fifth and Ninth Army Groups of
the First Front Army'' on the western route.51 This began the historic crossing of the
Grasslands of Chinghai.
The land known as the Grasslands of Chinghai is a part of the Songpan plateau. It is
between six and nine thousand feet above sea-level, but it is not mountainous. In the
summer months ''green grass grows everywhere and makes excellent pasture for the
Tibetans' yaks and horses. But it rains for eight or nine months in the year, and the
drainage is poor.''52 Because of the excessive amounts of rain, the land becomes marshy.
August was the worst month in the Grasslands for rain and mosquitoes and because the Red
Army's medical supplies were low and basically non-existent, many succumbed to ''black
malaria.''53 The Red Army had great difficulty procuring food during this part of the
Long March. Because the land was so marshy, the troops were unable to make fire, making
it impossible to cook what provisions they did have. The troops ate grain and vegetables
raw, causing some men to become violently ill. ''On emerging from the Grasslands the
depleted Red Army encountered the Nineteenth Division of Hu Tsung-nan at Paotso, but was
able to scatter it without too much difficulty.''54 Chiang Kai-shek had only one more
opportunity to defeat his enemies before they landed in the northern provinces of China.
The Kuomintang constructed trenches and bunkers and installed its guns at the Latzu Pass,
between the waters of the Pailung and Min Rivers. The only way the Red Army could cross
the Latzu Pass was to climb the single-plank bridge over the river, which the Kuomintang
controlled. The Red Army sent three companies of climbers to scale the right bank, and
they made it possible for the Communist force to capture the bridge and defeat the
Kuomintang.
At the end of October 1935, the troops that survived the Long March arrived in the town
of Wuchichen in the northern Shensi Soviet area. After the troops settled down, Mao ''led
a party over to Hsiashihwan, the seat of government of the Soviet area and headquarters
of the Shesni-Kansu Provincial Party Committee. Membership totalled less than forty
thousand upon entering Shensi in October 1935.''55 The Long March was best summed up by
stating:
When Mao Tse-tung and his threadbare band arrived in the loesslands of Shensi, they
represented a force, which, even on an optimistic estimate, was only a marginal element
in Chinese political life viewed on a national basis. Sustained principally by
discipline, hope and political formulae, Mao's group had, however, fortuitously garnered
several hidden assets which were later to prove of major significance.56 
The commitment and sheer determination that enabled the remaining troops to survive the
Long March helped the Chinese Communists establish themselves as the future leaders of
China. Had the Long March never occurred, it is quite possible that China would be today
under Japanese rule.
Mao Zedong's strategic genius helped establish the Chinese Communist Party as
indestructible. Because of his guerrilla warfare tactics during the encirclement
campaigns and his innate ability to know what the Kuomintang and Chiang Kai-shek were
going to do, he brought a sense of mystery and power to his Party.
When the Japanese invaded China in 1937, Chiang Kai-shek realized that he needed the
assistance of the Soviet Union in order to survive. In order to gain the assistance of
the Soviet Union, Chiang needed to amend the tense, combative situation with the Chinese
Communist Party. Mao had wanted to unify China for years and he looked upon this
opportunity as a way to ''break the ice in their relations with the KMT as a whole.''57
On February 10, 1937 the Chinese Communist Party sent a telegram to Chiang Kai-shek with
five conditions that needed to be met in order for the alliance to occur. Chiang and the
Kuomintang needed to: Stop the civil war and unite all forces to fight the Japanese;
Grant freedom to the people and release all political prisoners; Hold a national
conference of all parties and circles; Prepare for an anti-Japanese war; Improve the
people's welfare.58 If these conditions were met the Chinese Communist Party would
fulfill four promises. It would: Abolish the CCP rebellious policies against the KMT
government; Change the Soviet into a special region of the Republic and Red Army as a
part of the Nationalist Army; Realize a democratic government of the people in a general
election; Abandon the land distribution policy.59 After making amendments to these
requests the two parties came to an agreement for unification on September 15, 1937. This
collaboration ''proved to be a great success for the CCP as a political party and for Mao
as an individual person.''60
CONCLUSION
The Sino-Japanese War took place from 1937 until 1945. During these years, the Chinese
Communist Party strengthened its ability to persevere. The Red Army was extremely
disciplined and organized, allowing it to strengthen its influence during this time. Had
the two parties not been aligned with one another, it is doubtful that the invasion of
Japan could have been ended. Mao Zedong and his troops were underestimated not only by
the Nationalists but also by the Japanese. The Japanese never ''expected that the
Communist guerrillas could become their most potent enemy and that all the territory they
took over from the hostile Nationalists in North China would become the kingdom of the
even more hostile Communists.''61 Although the Communists and Mao Zedong did not come
into power until 1949, it is clear that the Long March galvanized commitment to the
Communist cause and was thus the precursor to the eventual victory of the Communist Party
in China. Mao's ability to negotiate and make decisions enabled him to take over China in
1949. Mao knew that in order for the Chinese Communist Party to survive he needed to
''stress three magic wands: Party organization, military struggle, and the united
front.''62 Mao's determination during the Long March solidified his eventual position as
Chairman of the New Republic of China and laid the foundations for the victory achieved
by the Chinese Communist Party in 1949.
Bibliography
ENDNOTES
1 Dick Wilson, The Long March. (New York: Viking Press, 1971), 10.
2 Ibid., 11.
3 Encyclopedia Brittanica, 1967 ed., s.v. "Sun Yat Sen," 430.
4 Ibid.
5 Wilson, 19.
6 Encyclopedia Brittanica, 1967 ed., s.v. "Chiang Kai-shek," 478.
7 Wilson, 29.
8 "Chiang Kai-shek," 479.
9 Encyclopedia Brittanica, 1967 ed., s.v. "Mao Tse-Tung," 817.
10 Frederic Tuten The Adventures of Mao on the Long March (USA: Marion Boyars, 1997), 37
11 Ibid., 41.
12 Ibid., 43.
13 Ibid., 51.
14 Jean Fritz, China's Long March: 6000 Miles of Danger (New York: Putnam Publishing
Group, 1988), 24.
15 Ibid., 28.
16 Ibid., 32.
17 Ibid.
18 Tuten., 53.
19 Ibid., 56.
20 Fritz, 59.
21 Ibid, 62.
22 Ibid.
23 Ibid., 63.
24 Wilson, 70.
25 Ibid., 67.
26 Tuten, 71.
27 Wilson, 91.
28 New York Times, November 19, 1934: Sec. I, 7.
29 New York Times, November 20, 1934: Sec. I, 11.
30 Wilson, 79.
31 Fritz, 88.
32 Wilson, 93.
33 Fritz, 92
34 Wilson, 109.
35 Ibid., 111.
36 Ibid, 112
37 Ibid, 115.
38 New York Times, January 7, 1935: Sec. I, 11.
39 New York Times, January 26, 1935: Sec. I, 10.
40 Fritz, 101.
41 New York Times, February 8, 1935: Sec. I, 5.
42 New York Times, April 4, 1935: Sec. I, 12.
43 Ibid.
44 Benjamin Yang. From Revolution to Politics: Chinese Communists on the Long March.
(Boulder: Westview Press, 1990), 143.
45 Ibid., 145.
46 Ibid.
47 Ibid., 148.
48 Ibid., 149.
49 Ibid., 151.
50 Ibid., 152.
51 Wilson, 201-02.
52 Ibid., 204.
53 Ibid., 206.
54 Tuten, 84
55 Ibid., 48.
56 Ibid., 54-56.
57 Yang, 239.
58 Ibid.
59 Ibid.
60 Ibid., 242.
61 Ibid., 251.
62 Ibid., 257.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Encyclopedia Brittanica, 1967 ed., s.v. "Sun Yat Sen."
Encyclopedia Brittanica, 1967 ed., s.v. "Chiang Kai-shek."
Encyclopedia Brittanica, 1967 ed., s.v. "Mao Tse-Tung."
Fritz, Jean. China's Long March: 6000 Miles of Danger. New York: Putnam 
Publishing Group, 1988.
New York Times, November 4, 1934.
New York Times, November 19, 1934.
New York Times, November 20, 1934.
New York Times, January 7, 1935
New York Times, January 26, 1935.
New York Times, February 8, 1935.
New York Times, April 4, 1935.
Tuten, Frederic. The Adventures of Mao on the Long March. USA: Marion Boyars, 
1997.
Wilson, Dick. The Long March. New York: Viking Press, 1971.
Yang, Benjamin. From Revolution to Politics: Chinese Communists on the Long March. 
Boulder: Westview Press, 1990.
ENDNOTES
1 Dick Wilson, The Long March. (New York: Viking Press, 1971), 10.
2 Ibid., 11.
3 Encyclopedia Brittanica, 1967 ed., s.v. "Sun Yat Sen," 430.
4 Ibid.
5 Wilson, 19.
6 Encyclopedia Brittanica, 1967 ed., s.v. "Chiang Kai-shek," 478.
7 Wilson, 29.
8 "Chiang Kai-shek," 479.
9 Encyclopedia Brittanica, 1967 ed., s.v. "Mao Tse-Tung," 817.
10 Frederic Tuten The Adventures of Mao on the Long March (USA: Marion Boyars, 1997), 37
11 Ibid., 41.
12 Ibid., 43.
13 Ibid., 51.
14 Jean Fritz, China's Long March: 6000 Miles of Danger (New York: Putnam Publishing
Group, 1988), 24.
15 Ibid., 28.
16 Ibid., 32.
17 Ibid.
18 Tuten., 53.
19 Ibid., 56.
20 Fritz, 59.
21 Ibid, 62.
22 Ibid.
23 Ibid., 63.
24 Wilson, 70.
25 Ibid., 67.
26 Tuten, 71.
27 Wilson, 91.
28 New York Times, November 19, 1934: Sec. I, 7.
29 New York Times, November 20, 1934: Sec. I, 11.
30 Wilson, 79.
31 Fritz, 88.
32 Wilson, 93.
33 Fritz, 92
34 Wilson, 109.
35 Ibid., 111.
36 Ibid, 112
37 Ibid, 115.
38 New York Times, January 7, 1935: Sec. I, 11.
39 New York Times, January 26, 1935: Sec. I, 10.
40 Fritz, 101.
41 New York Times, February 8, 1935: Sec. I, 5.
42 New York Times, April 4, 1935: Sec. I, 12.
43 Ibid.
44 Benjamin Yang. From Revolution to Politics: Chinese Communists on the Long March.
(Boulder: Westview Press, 1990), 143.
45 Ibid., 145.
46 Ibid.
47 Ibid., 148.
48 Ibid., 149.
49 Ibid., 151.
50 Ibid., 152.
51 Wilson, 201-02.
52 Ibid., 204.
53 Ibid., 206.
54 Tuten, 84
55 Ibid., 48.
56 Ibid., 54-56.
57 Yang, 239.
58 Ibid.
59 Ibid.
60 Ibid., 242.
61 Ibid., 251.
62 Ibid., 257.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Encyclopedia Brittanica, 1967 ed., s.v. "Sun Yat Sen."
Encyclopedia Brittanica, 1967 ed., s.v. "Chiang Kai-shek."
Encyclopedia Brittanica, 1967 ed., s.v. "Mao Tse-Tung."
Fritz, Jean. China's Long March: 6000 Miles of Danger. New York: Putnam 
Publishing Group, 1988.
New York Times, November 4, 1934.
New York Times, November 19, 1934.
New York Times, November 20, 1934.
New York Times, January 7, 1935
New York Times, January 26, 1935.
New York Times, February 8, 1935.
New York Times, April 4, 1935.
Tuten, Frederic. The Adventures of Mao on the Long March. USA: Marion Boyars, 
1997.
Wilson, Dick. The Long March. New York: Viking Press, 1971.
Yang, Benjamin. From Revolution to Politics: Chinese Communists on the Long March. 
Boulder: Westview Press, 1990.